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Abstract: In this paper, a dynamic game model of duopoly firms between the traditional electric power enterprises and new 
energy enterprises was established for analyzing the behaviors of electric power enterprises under different government 
carbon taxes policies and the corresponding Nash equilibrium. This goal of the model was set to maximize the total social 
welfare while considering the economic, social and environmental benefit. This model was further used to calculate the 
optimal carbon tax rate and optimal government subsidy level for both traditional electric power enterprises and new energy 
enterprises. The results showed that a reasonable carbon tax rate and return mode can optimize the structure of Chinese 
power industry, encouraging the high-carbon enterprises to reduce emission, promote the development of low carbon 
enterprises, and reduce the overall carbon dioxide emission from the power industry.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the continuous deterioration of global climate in recent years, ecological environment has become a 
matter of the world’s concern. Both domestic and foreign scholars have done research into the effect of 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. Among them, Whalley and Wigle estimated the impact of carbon tax on 
global carbon dioxide emissions, suggesting that carbon tax collection could reduce carbon dioxide emissions
 [1]
. 
Christoph et al. used CGE and studied the change of social welfare in an open economy when there was a 
difference in carbon tax 
[2]
; Wang Jinnan et al. argued that a low tax rate could obviously slow down the increase 
in CO2 emissions, but it just had a limited effect on China’s macro economy, so it was merely a feasible carbon 
tax policy 
[3]
. Wei Taoyuan et al. quantitatively analyzed the influence of carbon tax collection on China’s 
economy and greenhouse gas emission using China computable general equilibrium (CNACGE) model. When 
analyzing international carbon tax design, Michael pointed out that there was a proper unified carbon tax rate 
that could realize an emission distribution extremely close to social optimum, and then built a dynamic game 
model, concluding that a unified tax rate could help realize a Pareto optimum
 [4]
. When studying carbon 
tax-based carbon emission reduction, Wolfram et al. held that differentiated carbon taxes should be levied on 
production departments. They also presented a condition for the implementation of carbon tax differentiation 
[5]
. 
Zhang and Baranzini argued that carbon tax rate should be constantly increased with time going by to reflect the 
increase in the marginal abatement cost caused by the rise of carbon dioxide content in the atmosphere 
[6]
. Li 
Huan et al. built a three-phrase model for the game between the government and enterprises, suggesting that 
differentiated carbon taxes should be levied in China at the present stage 
[7]
. 
In conclusion, the research of government policies on carbon emission reduction and carbon tax has drawn 
wide attention from the scholars both at home and abroad, and achieved great results. But most of the existing 
literatures involve just the effects of carbon taxes on macro-economy, and some quantitatively put forward 
suggestions on the determination of a carbon tax rate by building a game model, while very few are focused on 
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the carbon tax policies for power sector. According to statistics, among all sectors, the power sector sees the 
highest proportion of carbon dioxide emissions nationwide. On the previous studies, by building a three-phase 
model for the game between the government, traditional power enterprises and new energy enterprises, this 
paper made a discussion on the power enterprises’ countermeasures against the carbon tax policy, as well as the 
carbon tax rate and subsidies made by the government, providing theoretical suggestions and data support for 
the formulation of government policies on carbon taxation. 
 
2.  BUILDING OF A CARBON TAX POLICY-BASED GAME MODEL FOR ENTERPRISE 
BEHAVIOR   CHOICES 
It is assumed in this model that the participants include the government department that participates in the 
setting of carbon tax rate and two representative power enterprises (Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2), of which 
Enterprise 1 represents the traditional power enterprises that use coal as the main fuel, while Enterprise 2 
represents the new energy enterprises that adopt photovoltaic material, hydroelectricity or nuclear power as the 
main fuel. And then a dynamic game model 
[8]
 is established, aimed at researching the optimal decision problem 
of the power system consisting of the government departments and duopoly firms. 
In particular, there are two optional government policies for carbon tax collection and subsidy distribution:  
1) levying a carbon tax on the traditional power enterprises, while subsidizing the new energy enterprises, called 
tax and subsidy model for short;  2) levying a carbon tax on the traditional power enterprises, which also 
actively develop emission reduction technologies, while the new energy enterprises aren’t subsidized, called 
subsidy-free tax collection & emission reduction model for short. The following is a comparative analysis on the 
game behavior orientations and results growing out of both policies. 
2.1 Variable and Parameter Setting 
⑴ enterprise 1 and enterprise 2 form a duopolistic power market. Suppose the gross output q of the power 
sector exactly   meets the market demand, and power price is denoted by inverse demand 
function )0,0()(  babQaQp . Where, a denotes a ceiling price acceptable to the market, and iq denotes 
the production of enterprise i, then 


2
1i
iqQ . 
⑵ Suppose the average production cost of per unit product is )2,1( ici , since new energy enterprises have 
to import key production components, and that the operation and maintenance cost is high, 21 cc  . 
⑶ There are differences in carbon emission between both types of power enterprises. Suppose Enterprise i 
emits ie of carbon dioxide per unit product, since the production in the new energy enterprise is characterized by 
cleanness and environmental protection, 21 ee  , Enterprise I emits iiqe of carbon dioxide in practical production. 
⑷ The government levies a carbon tax on enterprises according to quantity. Suppose carbon tax at t yuan is 
levied per unit carbon emission. 
⑸ The amount of loss caused by carbon dioxide emission can be denoted by environmental damage 
function eU . See Literature
 [9] for the details of the damage function, which can be assumed 
as
2
)( 22211 qeqekU e

 , where 0k , representing the degree of the state’s attention to climate. 
⑹ A simplified model is set up for new energy enterprises owing to the very low carbon emission. 
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Let 02 e  in all the following model solutions. 
⑺ Considering the high initial investment cost and long payoff period for Enterprise 2, the government 
gives it financial subsidies in accordance with its fixed output. Suppose s yuan is given to Enterprise 2 for per 
unit of product. 
2.2 Three-phase Dynamic Taxation & Subsidy Model and Analyses 
2.2.1 Model Building 
  The cost function for Enterprise 1: 
11111 qteqcC   
   Profit function: 
1111121
1
1 )( qteqcqbqbqa                                            (1) 
  The cost function for Enterprise 2: 
2222 sqqcC   
   Profit function:  
222221
1
2 )( sqqcqbqbqa                                          (2) 
The social total welfare function U in this paper is comprised of power enterprise profit, consumer surplus, 
carbon tax revenue, subsidy loss, and the environmental loss caused by carbon emission. Function U is shown as 
follows: 
2
11
2
212211
2
11
2
2122211121
1110
1
2
1
11
)(
2
1
)(
2
1
)()(
)(
2
1
)(
2
1
)()(
qekqqbqcaqca
qekqqbqcbqbqaqcbqbqa
UsqqteUU e



               (3) 
2.2.2 Model Analysis 
  Converse solution method is adopted since this model is built on complete information hypothesis. 
Step 1: as a follower, the new energy enterprise chooses an optimal output level for itself 
     Take the derivative of
2q by (2) and get: scbqbqaq



221
2
1
2 2  
      Let 0
2
1
2 


q
 and get that when Enterprise 1 chooses
1q , Enterprise 2 actually selects s2(q2 ) 
b
sbqca
qs
2
)( 1222

                                                  (4) 
     Take the derivative of Formula (2-4), identifying the influence of the output of Enterprise 1 and the 
amount of subsidies on Enterprise 2. 
0
1
2



q
q
, 02 


s
q
                                                       (5) 
Conclusion: The distribution of subsidies leads to an increase in the output of Enterprise 2, and thus encourages 
Enterprise 2 to develop, to achieve the goal of optimizing the industrial structure. The output of 
Enterprise 2 decreases with the output of Enterprise 1 increasing, and this is the inevitable 
outcome of oligarch competition in the market. 
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Step 2: as a leader, the traditional power enterprise selects an optimal output level for itself at a given tax rate 
level and subsidy level 
Substitute (4) into (1) and identify the profit made by Enterprise 1: 
2
11
1121
1
22
22
q
b
q
stecca


  
Take the derivative of
1q and get: 
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                                                  (6) 
  Meanwhile substitute (6) into (4) and get: 
b
stecca
q
4
32)32( 121
2

                                               (7) 
Take the derivative of (7) and identify the effect of carbon taxation and subsidy level on Enterprise 1. 
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q
, 01 
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s
q
                                                         (8) 
Conclusion: The introduction of carbon taxes and subsidies reduces the output of Enterprise 1, and this will 
help control carbon emissions in the power sector, so as to urge the traditional power enterprises to 
further reduce emissions. 
Step 3: the government levies a carbon tax on the power enterprise at the rate of *t and subsidizes the new 
energy enterprise at the level of *s  
    Take the derivative of t by (3) and get: 
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    Then, take the derivative of s by (2-3) and get: 
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    The optimum carbon tax rate *t and subsidy level *s should satisfy condition  
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Conclusion: Carbon tax rate is positively correlated to the cost of power generation by the new energy 
enterprise and traditional power enterprise, as well as to the subsidies to new energy enterprise and 
the carbon emission intensity in Enterprise 1. 
2.3 Subsidy-free Tax Collection & Emission Reduction Model and Analyses 
2.3.1Model Building 
On the premise of model hypothesis in 2.1, Enterprise 1 actively introduces emission reduction equipment 
and technology to purify carbon dioxide emissions. At this point, Enterprise 2 is not subsidized. Let emission 
purification level be r , which represents the decrement in carbon emission after the purification of per unit 
emission. Suppose the cost of purification treatment equals )(rc at purification level r , )(rc  is a monotonic 
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increasing concave function. Refer to Literature [10]- [16]  and let
r
r
rc


1
)(

, where, denotes purification 
cost coefficient, and is affected by the emission reduction technology adopted at that time. 
    The profit function for Enterprise 1: 
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    The profit function for Enterprise 2: 
22221
2
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    The social welfare function: 
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2.3.2 Model Analysis 
     Three-phase dynamic analysis is adopted for model analysis. 
Step 1: as a follower, the new energy enterprise chooses an optimal output level for itself 
       Take the derivative of 2q by (11) and get:  
221
2
2
2 2 cbqbqa
q


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       Let 0
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2 
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 and conclude that when Enterprise 1 selects
1q , Enterprise 2 actually chooses )( 22 qs  
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      Take the derivative of Formula (12), 0
1
2
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Conclusion: The output of Enterprise 2 is merely related to the output of Enterprise 1, and decreases with the 
output of Enterprise 1 increasing. 
Step 2: as a leader, the traditional power enterprise selects an optimal output level for itself at a given tax rate 
level and   subsidy level. 
       Take the derivative of r by Formula (10) and get: 
11112
2
1
)1(
qteqe
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



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                                               (13) 
Let 0
2
1 


r
 and get: 
t
r

 1                  
     Take the derivative of Formula（13) ,  0
dt
dr
, 
Conclusion: With carbon tax rate increasing, the enterprises become more proactive in reducing emissions, but 
acceleration drops off. 
   Then substitute (12) and (10) into (10), revealing the profit of Enterprise: 
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  Then substitute (2-14) into (2-12) and get: 
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Conclusion: The introduction of carbon tax decreases the output of Enterprise 1, and this will help control 
carbon emissions in the power sector, so as to urge the traditional power enterprises to further 
reduce emissions. 
Step 3: the government levies a carbon tax on the power enterprise at the rate of *t  
    Substitute (13) into (11) and get the following social total welfare function: 
2
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2
212211112 )(
2
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2
1
)()( qek
t
qqbqcaqeetcaU

   
The optimum carbon tax rate satisfies:  
2
* arg UMaxt
t
                                                           (16) 
 
3.  DATE SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
3.1 Parameter Estimation 
The related data of power enterprises’ cost, demand, emission, and loss function comes mainly from the 
relevant data of Chinese power sector in 2014. (1) The average cost of 1kwh power, including that in traditional 
power enterprises and new energy enterprises, is calculated. (2) The inverted demand curve of power products is 
estimated according to domestic research achievements [11], denoted by Qp 004.05.1  .(3) According to the 
data of carbon emission recorded in China Energy Statistical Yearbook, the traditional power enterprises emit 
0.96 kg of carbon when producing 1kwh power, namely 96.01 e . (4) Refer to foreign research achievements
 [9] 
and let pollution loss coefficient 005.0k . 
3.2 Numerical Simulation Result and Analysis 
Suppose the purification cost coefficient of Enterprise 1 is a constant, let 2.0 . In Model 2, since 
purification level 0r , 2.0t . By reference to the policies implemented by the countries in which a carbon 
tax has begun to be collected, considering China’s concrete national conditions, here the initial value of carbon 
tax rate is set equal to 0.2, and increases gradually. The enterprise’s production decision, social welfare and 
equilibrium outcome are shown as follows. 
Table 1. The Optimum Carbon Tax Rate in Model 1 
Carbon Tax Rate 
1t  (yuan/kg 2co ) 
Subsidy s 
(yuan/kg 2co ) 1
q
 2
q
 
CO2 Emissions 
(Ten THS Tons) 1  2  1U  
0.118 0.826 43.43 206.535 416.93 3.766 170.598 166.078 
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Table 2. The Influence of Changes in Carbon Tax Rate 
2t  r  1q  2q  
CO2 Emissions 
(Ten THS Tons) 1  2  2U  
0.20 0 127 61.5 1219.20 32.258 15.129 105.674 
0.22 0.047 122.314 63.843 1119.57 29.922 16.304 108.829 
0.24 0.087 117.837 66.081 1032.67 27.771 17.467 111.014 
0.26 0.123 113.543 68.228 956.01 25.784 18.620 112.494 
0.28 0.155 109.411 70.294 887.71 23.942 19.765 113.450 
0.30 0.184 105.424 72.288 826.36 22.229 20.902 114.013 
0.32 0.209 101.569 74.216 770.85 20.632 22.032 114.276 
0.33 0.222 99.686 75.157 745.01 19.875 22.594 114.318 
0.34 0.233 97.831 76.084 720.31 19.142 23.155 114.310 
0.36 0.254 94.202 77.899 674.06 17.748 24.273 114.166 
0.38 0.275 90.673 79.663 631.50 16.443 25.385 113.885 
0.40 
  
1.08 
0.293 
 
---- 
87.235 
 
---- 
81.382 
 
125.042 
592.17 
 
---- 
15.220 
 
---- 
26.492 
 
62.542 
113.496 
 
93.7343 
 
From Table we can get: 
(1) With carbon tax t increasing, the social total welfare function first increases and then decreases. With carbon 
tax t increasing, the output of Enterprise 1 keeps decreasing, and when 08.1t , Enterprise 1 stops 
production. Enterprise constantly increases its output, and Enterprise 1 earns an increasingly lower profit, 
while Enterprise 2 sees an increase in its profit. 
(2) With carbon tax t increasing, carbon emission drops off, suggesting that an increase in carbon tax rate can 
effectively reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the power sector. But with carbon tax t increasing, the 
purification level of Enterprise 1 increases slowly, and thus it becomes less proactive in reducing emissions. 
(3) When
12 tt  , the carbon tax rate in Model 2 is higher than that in Model 1. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
On the premise of carbon tax collection, for the decision-making behaviors of the government and power 
enterprises, this paper built an oligarchic game and competition model, and quantitatively analyzed the optimal 
decisions respectively made by the government and enterprises, identifying an optimum carbon tax rate and an 
optimum output, with a numerical simulation conducted on them. It then compared the optimal decisions under 
these two models, coming to the following conclusions: 
First, when the state levies a carbon tax, for a traditional power enterprise, being proactive in reducing 
emissions is the best measure. So, the government should make a proper carbon tax policy, and then on the 
premise of guaranteeing social total welfare optimization, encourage and instruct the traditional power 
enterprises to purify carbon emissions to enhance their market competitiveness. 
Second, for a new energy enterprise, it can maximize its profit when it’s subsidized by the government. But 
Enterprise 2 cannot supply electricity steadily or bid for electric network easily. Its high cost at present cannot 
enable it to replace Enterprise 1 in spite of subsidies. So, the government should set a rational carbon tax rate 
and then steer the power sector in a low-carbon direction. 
Third, currently, power sector has become China’s largest source of carbon dioxide emissions, since Chinese 
power generation structure is dominated by coal, while new energy just occupies a very small proportion. 
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Therefore, the power generation structure must be optimized. To this end, we must encourage the production of 
new energy, and meanwhile strengthen the efforts to reduce emissions in the traditional power enterprises. 
Fourth, an analysis based on the practical situation indicates that to achieve the emission reduction target, 
the government usually tends to directly subsidize clean energy enterprises in the short term, but this practice 
will dampen the traditional power enterprises’ enthusiasm for emission reduction, and thus undermine the 
stability of the power sector. For long-term steady development of the power sector, the government needs to set 
a rational carbon tax rate to support high-carbon enterprises in emission reduction, and encourage new energy 
enterprises to develop. 
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